Latest News from Al Taghyeer
Al Taghyeer
20 hours ago
- Politics
- Al Taghyeer
Urgent Humanitarian Appeal from al-Fashir Resistance Committees
The crisis extends beyond food to include acute shortages in medicine, water, and basic essential services while the city is under daily indiscriminate artillery bombardment. Al-Fashir: Altaghyeer The Coordination of the Resistance Committees in al-Fashir, capital of North Darfur in far west Sudan, on Monday issued an urgent humanitarian appeal to stop the comprehensive humanitarian disaster in the city. Al-Fashir has been under constant shelling and bombarment by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, who seek to capture the only remaining major city in Darfur, still under army control. The coordination confirmed that famine has become a daily reality threatening the lives of thousands of families who can no longer find food to eat. The Coordination Committees pointed out that the crisis is not limited to food but also includes severe shortages in medicines, water, and basic survival services. The Coordination appealed to charity organizations and government agencies to provide direct and urgent support to the voluntary Communal Kitchens, which serve as the last lifeline for thousands of hungry people, and which have mostly stopped operating due to lack of supplies. Markets are nearly empty of essential commodities, and when available, the soaring prices make them inaccessible to the vast majority of the civilian population, the Coordination said. Dozens of neighbourhoods are subjected to daily shelling, exacerbating the plight of civilians trapped in hunger and fear, dying silently amidst growing local and international indifference, the Committees complained.
Al Taghyeer
5 days ago
- Health
- Al Taghyeer
Khartoum cholera outbreak due to environmental degradation, minister
There are over 600 confirmed cases of cholera per week during the past four weeks, the health minister said, adding that this increase was expected because of prevailing poor environmental conditions. Khartoum: Altaghyeer Sudanese Minister for Health, Haytham Mohamed Ibrahim, has attributed the cholera outbreak in Khartoum state to environmental degradation following the army recapture of areas and the return of residents, particularly in Jebel Awlia and Salha quarters south and west of Khartoum respectively, with acute lack of clean drinking water and poor environmental conditions. The minister said in press statements on Saturday between 600 to 700 cholera cases were being confirmed weekly over the past couple of weeks, adding that this increase was expected given the spreading of poor environmental conditions. The minister praised the efforts exerted by Khartoum State government in collaboration with UN agencies and international organizations, resulting in the establishment of at least 8 cholera treatment centres and boosted disease control efforts. Cholera resurgence has also been reported in six other states including al-Gezira, central Sudan, where localities like al-Haj Abdullah took the drastic precautionary measure of closing down schools and markets places, according to news reports. Al-Taj Abdel Rahman, working at the city's main hospital, revealed that 46 cases and 6 deaths were reported over the past six days. The Health Minister has, however, stressed that the health situation was fully under continuous monitoring by the Federal Ministry of Health's Emergency Room, which works around the clock to implement the required measures. He confirmed that the upcoming cholera vaccination campaign will contribute to reducing the number of cases. The two year old war, between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has led to a catastrophic collapse of medical services coupled with the spread of diseases and threat of famine.
Al Taghyeer
6 days ago
- Business
- Al Taghyeer
Sudan's Shadow Economy: The Hidden Alliances Funding War and Suppressing Civilian Transition
Sudan's Shadow Economy: The Hidden Alliances Funding War and Suppressing Civilian Transition By: Omer Sidahmed May 2025 From State Economy to Loot Economy Sudan's shadow economy didn't arise in a vacuum. It wasn't formed on the margins of the state — it emerged from its very core. Over decades, it became a central tool in the hands of a militarized system comprising the army, intelligence agencies, and militias. These forces forged alliances with Islamist political networks to entrench control over the state and society. With the eruption of the revolution and then the outbreak of war, the true nature of this economy became clear: not just a source of illicit wealth, but a fuel for conflict, a platform for distorting public consciousness, and a shield protecting power networks from collapse. An Economy Without — and Against — the State Sudan's shadow economy has evolved beyond the traditional definition of informal activities. It is now a structured system operating outside the state, financing, smuggling, exporting, and militarizing with no oversight or accountability. It manifests in the smuggling of gold from conflict zones via armed and politically protected routes across borders, in currency trading that sustains the parallel market outside the banking system, and in a web of foreign trade activities managed by a small elite tied to security apparatuses. These include fuel import companies shielded by the remnants of the former regime, as well as informal financial transfers that sustain the war economy. Estimates suggest that between 50% and 80% of Sudan's gold production is smuggled out of official channels. The country's gold smuggling losses over the past decade are estimated at no less than $23 billion — and possibly as high as $36.8 billion. These numbers highlight the catastrophic economic impact of the shadow economy, and how gold has shifted from a national resource to a secret source of war funding and elite enrichment. From Sanctions to Domination: The Birth of a Hidden Alliance During the years of U.S. sanctions, alternative networks for trade and finance emerged, led by businessmen and security-linked institutions aligned with the regime. Instead of addressing the crisis through national alternatives, the state opened the market to a parasitic class that thrived in the shadows, becoming the economic arm of the ruling power. Even after sanctions were lifted in 2020, this structure was not dismantled — it deepened. Following the October 25 coup, these networks reasserted control over markets and resources, initiating a new phase: converting the shadow economy into a direct war-financing mechanism. Rentierism: The Structural Foundation of the Shadow Economy One of the deep-rooted causes behind the swelling of Sudan's shadow economy is the dominance of a rentier economy — the prevailing model since independence. Sudan has historically relied on raw material exports with no added value: from cotton and oilseeds in the 1960s and 70s, to oil in the 2000s, and finally to gold after South Sudan's secession in 2011. This dependency has left the country vulnerable to external markets and lacking an independent domestic production base. Under authoritarian regimes and institutional corruption, the revenues from these resources were not invested in sustainable development. Instead, they were redistributed through patronage networks favoring ruling elites and security agencies. Rather than being a driver for development, the rentier model became a breeding ground for the shadow economy. Crucially, this economy did not emerge from the peripheries, as often assumed — it was born and nurtured in the center, within state institutions themselves, with complicity from the ruling elite. It became a tool for unofficial financing and consolidating political and military power. In this way, rentierism fused with corruption and militarization to create a parallel economy — not based on production, but on looting, not governed by law, but shielded by it. Arms and Narcotics Trade: The Forbidden Face of the Shadow Economy One of the most dangerous aspects of the shadow economy is the involvement of the ruling system in arms and narcotics trafficking. During the Al-Ingaz regime, documented reports from media and social platforms revealed incidents of 'drug containers' arriving in or passing through Sudan under the protection or complicity of security agencies. Though hidden from public view, this trade became a covert funding source for war, a tool for militia recruitment, and a means of money laundering that expanded the influence of power centers. A Funded War on Awareness: Media as a Weapon Against Civilian Rule The shadow economy doesn't just fund weapons; it also fuels a war for control over public consciousness. This media campaign is managed from hubs outside Sudan — in capitals such as Cairo, Istanbul, Dubai, and Doha — led by media figures from the former regime and affiliated ideological-security networks. These groups produce funded content on social media that justifies the war, demonizes revolutionary forces, rallies public opinion against civilian transition, and promotes the continuation of a war that has displaced millions, killed thousands, and devastated the country. The objective isn't only to suppress armed revolution, but to assassinate the very idea of a civilian state. Democracy is portrayed as a threat to stability, while military rule is presented as the only option for national unity — a blatant embodiment of state and societal militarization. Dismantling the System: Not Administrative Reform, But a Long-Term Struggle The dismantling of Sudan's shadow economy cannot be viewed as an administrative or legal procedure — especially in the context of an open war, institutional collapse, and military control over economic lifelines. This system won't fall through decisive victory alone, but through the erosion of its absolute control, when cracks begin to show in the regime's security and economic structure. Despite the militarization of daily life, civilian action must not be paralyzed or surrender to the status quo. The path forward lies in working within the war, not on its margins, to develop a realistic and radical transition project. This begins with fostering new public awareness that exposes the structural link between arms and wealth, and places the shadow economy under popular and international scrutiny. This effort requires close monitoring of the parallel market and analysis of its mechanisms, paving the way for fair economic policies and legislation that reorganize the market and dismantle smuggling monopolies. Crimes such as trafficking, narcotics trade, and gold theft must be documented and transformed into legal and media files that can be pursued, not merely retold. At the same time, independent and community-based media must rise as a front of resistance, countering the disinformation produced abroad and challenging the official narratives that justify war and vilify civilian transition. This media confrontation is not a luxury — it's essential for building a coherent, resistant public opinion. Finally, any attempt at transformation must include building flexible and realistic civilian alliances that propose a national alternative project. This project must redefine the state, sever the link between power and wealth, and shift economic control from militias back to the community. This is not a ready-made plan — it's an open front that requires daily effort and initiative from within the cracks war has created, not in waiting for its end. Working Amid War: No Time to Wait Despite the militarized reality and escalating conflict, this should not be an excuse for inaction or surrender to the status quo. On the contrary, the need now is to work from within the war — within its cracks — to lay the groundwork for a true civilian transformation. In a context like Sudan, change doesn't wait for victory — it is built inside the struggle itself, through realistic, deliberate steps rooted in public action and collective will. Tools for Change: From Awareness to Organization This path requires new tools and the creation of a critical public consciousness that understands the battle is not just military or political — but economic and cultural too. It begins by exposing the economic foundations of the armed system and highlighting the structural link between weapons and wealth. This enables internal and external pressure on power centers. Monitoring the parallel market and understanding its mechanisms is key for a future confrontation using just policies that dismantle shadow monopolies and restore the economy to the public. Equally important is the documentation of crimes like smuggling, drug trafficking, and gold looting — vital for building legal and media cases that can be pursued in future moments of accountability. On the media front, alternative, independent, and community media must be supported to counter the misinformation spread from foreign media rooms and to promote a resistance narrative based on the revolution, not the war machine. In parallel, civilian alliances must be built — realistic and resilient — offering a political and economic alternative that redefines the state-society-resource relationship and breaks the link between authority and plunder. An Open Front: A Beginning, Not an End What we face today is not a passing political crisis but a historic moment requiring a complete redefinition of the national project. This is not a finished blueprint, but an open front for gradual transformation — built not from outside collapse, but from within it. The true challenge is not waiting for war to end, but using the fractures it created to fuel civil resistance and spark new beginnings — toward a democratic, civilian, just, and salvaging state that reflects the people's aspirations, not the interests of entrenched elites. References 1. 1. Global Witness (2019). 'The Ones Left Behind: Sudan's Secret Gold Empire.' 2. 2. International Crisis Group (2022). 'The Militarization of Sudan's Economy.' 3. 3. Human Rights Watch (2020). 'Entrenched Impunity: Gold Mining and the Darfur Conflict.' 4. 4. United Nations Panel of Experts on the Sudan (2020–2023). Reports to the Security Council. 5. 5. BBC Arabic & Al Jazeera Investigations (2021–2023). Coverage of Sudan's illicit trade and media operations. 6. 6. Radio Dabanga (2015–2023). Reports on drug trafficking and corruption during Al-Ingaz regime. 7. 7. Sudan Tribune (2020). 'Forex crisis and informal currency trading in Sudan.'
Al Taghyeer
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Al Taghyeer
Appointment of Kamal Idris as Prime Minister of Sudan stirs contradictory reactions
Observers describe the appointment as void of required political legitimacy and apparently failing to secure broad consensus. Port Sudan: Altaghyeer The appointment of Dr. Kamal Idris as Prime Minister of Sudan on Monday has stirred intense debate among those who support him and a strong reaction among those who opposing his appointment, as he has been linked to controversial regimes, including Omar al-Bashir's, the December Revolution but equally with the current war period. Who is Kamal Idris? Idris graduated from the University of Khartoum's Faculty of Law. He holds a Ph.D. in International Law from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He served as Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1997-2003. Throughout his career, he has held various distinguished positions, including member of the UN International Law Commission and spokesperson for the Group of Developing Countries. He is fluent in Arabic, English, and French, with knowledge of Spanish. Idris has received numerous awards and honors, including honorary doctorates from several universities worldwide. Contradiction and Criticism The newly appointed Prime Minister was described as a self-contradictory who seeks only his own interests. Critics pointed out that he was an uncommitted member of the Sudanese Communist Party and engaged in activities of its university students' offshoot 'the Democratic Front' and a member of the late Sudan military ruler Jaffar Nimeri's party 'the Sudanese Socialist Union' before aligning with the Islamic Front. He was a candidate in the 2010 Presidential Elections against al-Bashir with the support of Islamists, who wanted to make the elections plausible as a true democratic process. He appeared in a video clip during the latest revolution describing al-Bashir's regime as criminal and demanding it's resignation and recently appeared in a recording speech denouncing any debasing of the national army, saying such persons should be denied to assume any public posts. Challenges Ahead of the New Prime Minister The new Prime Minister Faces significant challenges, including managing the political and economic crisis, rebuilding state institutions, and achieving stability amidst the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. He also faces challenges of being accepted by the Sudanese masses, with many expressing their rejection of his appointment, citing corruption cases linked to his career. In 2006, he reportedly faked his birth date certificate, pushing his birth date from 1945 to 1954, to fit for staying at his job, leaping away from looming retirement age at the time. Reactions Some observers believe that Kamal Idris's chances of success might be greater than expected given his neutral stance and this step could potentially pave the way for a ceasefire. But others cited reservations. Nour al-Din Salah al-Din, a partisan leader, stated that the appointment lacks the required political legitimacy, emphasizing such a move needs broad consensus resulting from a Sudanese inclusive political process. Academic Adel Taha Suleiman believes that the question was not rejecting Kamal Idris' appointment but rather putting an end to the current raging war. Idris' appointment was backed by the Islamic movement leadership who wanted the war to continue therefore Idris will come and leave without solving the roots causes of the problem, he argued.
Al Taghyeer
15-05-2025
- Business
- Al Taghyeer
Gold and the Financing of War in Sudan: From Chaos to Tools of Control
Gold and the Financing of War in Sudan: From Chaos to Tools of Control By: Omar Sidahmed Introduction: A Royal Legacy and a Forgotten Fortune For millennia, gold was the backbone of civilizations that flourished in what is now Sudan—particularly the kingdoms of Kush and Napata. The region was known to the ancient Egyptians and Greeks as 'Nubia' or 'Land of Gold,' a name reflecting the abundance of this precious metal and its link to sovereignty and trade. Inscriptions in Napata and Meroë, along with trade routes connecting Aswan, Halfa, Meroë, and Suakin, are lasting evidence of this (Ministry of Minerals, 2024). What was once a symbol of sovereignty has, in recent decades, become a driver of chaos and division. Gold is now exploited to fund conflicts and smuggled under the shadow of institutional weakness and the collapse of state structures (Global Witness, 2022; Chatham House, 2025). Gold: A Treasury of War Instead of a Resource for Development Despite Sudan's vast gold reserves—among the largest in Africa—this wealth has largely fueled war and illicit trade rather than supporting the national economy. Official figures estimate production between April and August 2023 at just 2 tons, while between 50% to 80% of actual output is smuggled, primarily through the United Arab Emirates (Sudan Tribune, 2023; Time Magazine, 2024). Both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army have financed their operations with gold revenues since the outbreak of war in April 2023 (Chatham House, 2025). Production and Export: Misleading Figures Sudan's gold sector boomed after 2010, peaking in 2016 at 93 tons. However, production dropped to 34.5 tons in 2022 before climbing again to 65 tons in 2024 (Ministry of Minerals, 2024). Yet, despite increased production, revenues declined—from $2.02 billion in 2022 to $1.6 billion in 2024—even as global gold prices rose by 30% (World Gold Council, 2024). This gap points to major flaws in marketing and oversight systems, further confirming widespread smuggling (Global Witness, 2022). The Parallel Economy, Manipulation, and Corruption Gold has become a pillar of Sudan's informal economy, traded outside the formal banking system. Many gold firms operate under the protection of powerful entities, beyond the reach of state oversight (Sudanese Transparency Initiative, 2020). Some registered companies are allegedly involved in smuggling, backed by security agencies, while mining concessions are often awarded based on political ties, not economic merit (Suleiman, 2021; Africa Intelligence, 2023). Smuggling: The Largest Leak An estimated 70% to 80% of Sudan's gold production is smuggled annually across borders with Egypt, Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic via local and international networks (Sudan Tribune, 2023; Global Witness, 2022). Smuggling has become institutionalized, with intertwined interests between domestic actors and foreign entities (Chatham House, 2025; ICG, 2023). Environmental and Health Impacts Traditional mining relies heavily on unregulated use of mercury and cyanide, leading to water contamination, soil degradation, and outbreaks of respiratory and skin diseases—particularly in the Nile River State, South Kordofan, and Darfur (WHO, 2023; BBC Africa, 2021; Renewable Energy Center, 2023). War: Gold as Fuel for Conflict Since 2023, gold mines in Darfur and South Kordofan have come under the control of armed factions that use the proceeds to purchase weapons and fund military operations (Chatham House, 2025; Global Witness, 2022). These mines have effectively become 'sovereign zones' outside the reach of the state. A Decade of Losses: The Cost of Smuggled Gold Independent reports indicate that between 50% and 80% of Sudan's gold output is smuggled, depriving the state of massive revenues (Global Witness, 2022; Sudan Tribune, 2023). Based on the 2024 global average price of gold ($64,000/kg), Sudan's losses over the past decade are estimated between $23 billion and $36.8 billion: Item Quantity (tons) Value in USD Total Production (2014–2024) 719.7 $46.06 billion Smuggling at 50% 359.85 $23.03 billion Smuggling at 80% 575.76 $36.84 billion Sources: Ministry of Minerals, 2024; STPT, 2024; Chatham House, 2025) A Lesson from Burkina Faso Despite fragile security, Burkina Faso implemented successful reforms to reclaim control over its gold sector. Since 2022, reforms have included: Amending mining laws. Establishing a national company to manage major mines like Boungou and Wahgnion. Creating a national gold reserve. By 2025, annual production rose to 62 tons, and the government collected over 11 tons from artisanal mining in just one quarter (Chatham House, 2025). The sector has helped finance the national budget and reduced reliance on foreign aid. This success was not a miracle—but a practical model Sudan could follow with political will and a clear economic vision. Urgent Reforms Smart Oversight: Issue gold-backed bonds for delivered gold. Deploy mobile purchasing units to curb smuggling. Launch a national digital platform for real-time gold pricing (STPT, 2024). Institutional and Structural Reform: Publish concession contracts and production reports. Ban ownership or operation of mining companies by government officials. Strengthen regional cooperation to dismantle smuggling networks (Global Witness, 2022; Chatham House, 2025). Strategic Proposals: Sudanese sovereign gold bullion. Gold bonds to finance strategic projects. A national 'Gold City.' Production-sharing models. Joint-stock companies between the state and miners. Cooperatives for artisanal miners. Exclusive export and purchasing through the Central Bank. A national import matrix backed by gold. Link mining to renewable energy. A Sudanese exchange for gold and minerals. Gold as a Financial Asset A national exchange and gold-backed bonds would transform gold from a source of corruption and conflict into a strategic financial asset for reconstruction and long-term investment (World Bank, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2023). Conclusion: Reclaiming Gold from the Grip of Chaos — A Test of Sovereignty Sudan's gold sector is no longer just an economic file—it is a litmus test for state sovereignty and the authenticity of reform efforts. How this wealth is managed reflects the nature of power, governance, and institutional integrity. Gold can either be administered with the mindset of a modern state—anchored in law, accountability, transparency, and institutional strength—or remain a tool for militias, a commodity for patronage, and a fuel for endless conflict. Between these paths lies the shape of Sudan's future. Today, gold symbolizes both the depth of the national crisis and the seeds of its resolution. Just as it has funded war, it can fund recovery. Just as it has been squandered, it can become a national asset—if managed with transparency and real oversight. Global precedents prove this transformation is possible. Burkina Faso did it. Others have too—through sovereign visions, not just technical fixes. Sudan must now reclaim its role: regulator, protector, and steward of public wealth. What's needed isn't isolated actions but a holistic national vision—one that redefines the relationship between state and resources, society and wealth, politics and the economy. A transparent exchange, an independent refinery, a powerful regulatory body, and a mining sector free from shadow control—these are not luxuries. They are the building blocks of a new Sudan. Gold is no longer just a resource. It's the clearest test: either we reclaim it for the people, or leave it to warlords and arms dealers to dismantle the state. The moment of decision is here. The window is still open—but it won't stay that way for long. Final Cry: Whoever Controls the Gold… Controls the Future In a country where a mine's yield can buy an arsenal, gold is no longer a raw natural resource. It has become a decisive weapon in the struggle for power. The debate over gold in Sudan is no longer economic—it's a battle for the soul of the state. Sudan now faces a critical choice: either reclaim this sovereign asset from the grip of chaos, corruption, and smuggling—or watch the forces of war and secrecy keep using it to drive collapse. The choice is clear. Either gold becomes the foundation for rebuilding a new Sudan—or remains loot for the merchants of blood and arms. Arabic Sources Sudanese Ministry of Minerals. Annual Performance Report 2016–2024. Sudanese Ministry of Minerals. Gold Sector Development Plan, 2023. Future Studies Center. Traditional Mining Sector, 2020. Suleiman, Ahmed. The Shadow Economy of Gold in Sudan, Arab Center, 2021. Sudan Tribune. Various reports, 2022–2024. Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT). Gold Sector Transparency Report, 2020. Al Jazeera Net. 'Sudan's Gold and the Parallel Economy,' 2023. Al Jazeera Net. 'Mercury Mining in Sudan,' 2022. Renewable Energy Studies Center. Impact of Traditional Mining on the Environment, 2023. International Sources Chatham House. Gold Production During the War in Sudan, 2025. Chatham House. Sudan and the Regional Conflict System, 2025. Time Magazine. Blood Gold and Sudan-UAE Relations, 2024. Wikipedia. Sudanese Civil War (2023–Present). Global Witness. Militarization of Gold in Sudan, 2022. Global Witness. Transparency and Accountability in the Gold Sector, 2022. Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker (STPT). Tracking Illicit Gold Flows in Sudan, 2023–2024. International Crisis Group (ICG). Gold and War in Sudan, 2023. World Health Organization (WHO). Mercury Exposure in Sudanese Mining, 2023. BBC Africa. Toxic Gold Extraction in Sudan, 2021. World Bank. Sudan Economic Outlook, 2022. World Gold Council. Gold Demand Trends Q1 2024. Africa Intelligence. Mining Sector Reports on Sudan, 2020–2024.
